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If consumers wholly or partially control a ￿rm with market power they will
charge less than the pro￿t maximising price. Starting at the usual monopoly
price, a small price reduction will have a second order e⁄ect on pro￿ts but a
￿rst order e⁄ect on consumer surplus. Despite this desirable static result, it has
been argued that cooperatives are vulnerable to take-over by outsiders who will
run them as for-pro￿t businesses. This paper studies takeovers of cooperatives.
We argue that cooperatives are in fact quite stable due to the Grossman-Hart
problem of free riding during takeovers.
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11 INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates whether cooperatives are vulnerable to takeover. It has been
argued that consumer ownership of ￿rms, as exempli￿ed in cooperatives may reduce
or even eliminate monopoly distortions. Hansmann (1996) cites a number of examples
where ￿rms are owned either by those who trade with them either on input or output
markets. He argues that, in many cases, this is to counter monopoly or monopsony
power. This practice is very common among ￿rms, which supply inputs to or buy
produce from farms.
Refsell (1914) explains in detail how cooperative grain elevators came to dominate
the mid-west. Their share of the industry expanded rapidly at the expense of for-pro￿t
rivals during the period 1903-1913. It is clear from his account that the main reason
for this was a response to monopoly pricing by for-pro￿t grain elevators. In relatively
remote rural areas, it is easier to establish a local monopoly. This is not an isolated
example. Cooperatives supply many inputs to farms and purchase the produce of
farms in many countries. Farm cooperatives can be quite large organisations. Some of
them have forward integrated into processing distribution and marketing. A number
of well-known brand names have been developed by farmers￿cooperatives such as
Welchs, Sun-Maid and Sun Kist.1
The reason that such organisations come into existence and thrive is that in rel-
atively remote rural areas competition is not possible due to the small scale of the
market. If these businesses were organised on a for-pro￿t basis they would have
monopoly power. Farm cooperatives (at least partially) internalise the distortion and
thus bring about an improvement in allocative e¢ ciency. For similar reasons many
professional associations are organised as partnerships. Examples of this can be seen
1For further details see Hansmann (1996) Ch. 7.
2in professional services such as lawyers and accountants. The reason for this is that
the ￿rm is a monopoly supplier of inputs such as client lists, which these people need
to work. Partnerships reduce the distortion.
Theoretical arguments also show that consumer ownership of monopolies may be
bene￿cial, see, Farrell (1985), Hart and Moore (1996), Kelsey and Milne (2005), Ren-
strom and Yalcin (2003) and Demichelis and Ritzberger (2006). In circumstances
where competition is not possible, this reduces monopoly distortions without govern-
ment intervention. Consider a ￿rm that is the sole producer of a particular good.
Suppose that consumers have a substantial in￿ uence over its pricing and output de-
cisions. It is in the interest of consumer-shareholders to reduce the price below the
monopoly level, since a small price reduction will result in a second order loss of
pro￿ts but a ￿rst order gain in their consumer surplus. If a ￿rm faces input markets
which are imperfectly competitive, then a similar argument establishes it may be
desirable to give input suppliers in￿ uence in a ￿rm￿ s decisions.
A number of di⁄erent legal arrangements may serve to give consumers and/or
suppliers in￿ uence over a ￿rm￿ s decisions. If the input concerned is a form of labour,
the ￿rm could be a worker cooperative or a partnership. Partnerships serve to give
only those kinds of labour for which there is a market distortion in￿ uence, while other
kinds of labour can be hired on a standard wage contract. Consumer cooperatives
would serve to control monopoly power in output markets. Alternatively the inter-
ested parties could hold blocks of shares in a limited liability company. (The latter
possibility is discussed in more detail in section 3.4.)
Despite the desirable static properties of consumer ownership of monopolies it has
been argued that such a ￿rm will not be stable in the long-run. For instance, Farrell
(1985) argues that consumer-controlled monopolies may be vulnerable to takeover.
3To understand his argument, consider a monopoly, which is selling below the pro￿t-
maximising price, since shareholders are also consumers. Farrell argues that a raider
(who is not a consumer) could buy up shares at the current value and then make a
pro￿t by increasing the product price to the pro￿t maximising level, thereby increas-
ing the value of his/her shares.
This will reduce the utility of a majority of the members of the cooperative.
Although they sell their shares at a premium, the subsequent price rise will reduce
their consumer surplus. It is possible that a member who only makes small purchases
of the ￿rm￿ s output will gain. However, aggregated over all ex-ante members of the
cooperative, the gains out-weight the losses. Thus total surplus is reduced. There
is in addition a redistribution of wealth from the members of the cooperative to the
raider. Thus there is a strong presumption that social welfare is reduced.
The members of the cooperative will typically be worse o⁄if the takeover succeeds,
however Farrell argues that they will accept the raider￿ s o⁄er because the output price
is a public good for shareholders. As usual, free-rider problems imply that they will
not internalise the bene￿ts to others of a low price and hence will accept the o⁄er.
Although this argument is logically correct, it does not appear to be supported by
the evidence. Cooperatives, partnerships and similar organisations have dominated
many lines of business over long periods of time. Thus it does not always seem to be
the case that cooperatives are unstable. Nor is it necessarily true that for-pro￿t ￿rms
tend to take over an industry. As noted above, in the twentieth century cooperatives
took over much of the trade with farms in rural areas in the USA and a number of
other countries.
There have been some instances where cooperatives have been restructured as for
pro￿t businesses. However these appear to be driven by changes in regulation and/or
4tax law, not any intrinsic instability of cooperatives. For instance, in the recent past
in the UK and Australia, building societies (mutual banks) have been replaced by for-
pro￿t banks. This change occurred because the building societies lost a long standing
tax advantage. Overall we believe that these industry structures do not appear to be
as unstable as Farrell￿ s argument suggests.
Hansmann (1996) shows that mutual banks and insurance companies gained busi-
ness at the expense of for pro￿t rivals in the nineteenth century. He argues that this
was because they had superior monitoring abilities, which enabled them to control
moral hazard. In particular the nature of the deposit contract meant that for-pro￿t
banks have an incentive to make excessively risky investments. If successful, the bank
owners take all the gain, while depositors bear the bulk of the losses if the investments
fail. In a mutual bank, which could be a trust or a cooperative of depositors, there
is no residual claimant. Thus nobody gains by taking undue risks. Mutual banks
also had superior abilities to control moral hazard by borrowers. Throughout the
twentieth century increased regulation reduced the scope for moral hazard. In par-
ticular widespread deposit insurance gave savers less reason to prefer mutual banks.
As result they became less common.2
In the present paper we undertake a more detailed analysis of takeovers of cooper-
atives. Our model is based on a two-stage game between a raider and the members of
the cooperative. In the ￿rst stage, the raider decides whether to make an o⁄er for the
members shares and how much to bid. Secondly the members simultaneously decide
whether or not to accept the o⁄er. We show that raider can only take over the ￿rm if
2This regulation was partly counter productive. Mutual savings and loan had a signi￿cant lower
default rate during the savings and loans crisis of the 1980￿ s. Despite this they were charged the
same premiums for deposit insurance as for-pro￿t rivals. Thus the e⁄ect of regulation was perverse,
since it failed to reward mutual savings and loans for their superior ability to control moral hazard.
5(s)he can increase its value by more than the bene￿t the median shareholder gets from
the cooperative. If the median and mean members have the same preferences this
implies that takeovers will only occur if they maximise total surplus. Or equivalently
ine¢ cient takeovers can only occur to the extent that there is a deviation between
the preferences of the median and the mean member. We argue that our results are
reasonably robust and do not depend crucially on the structure of the game.
Farrell￿ s argument relies on a free-riding problem. Each existing shareholder will
ignore the e⁄ect of his/her decision on the product price and hence will sell to a higher
o⁄er by the raider. However we believe that this argument needs to be modi￿ed,
since there is a similar free-riding problem with respect to the stockmarket value of
the ￿rm, see for instance Grossman and Hart (1980). Once the latter e⁄ect is taken
into account, we argue that reducing price below the pro￿t maximising level will not
make a consumer-owned monopolist particularly vulnerable to take-over.
2 TAKEOVERS
2.1 Model
In this section we develop a simple model of takeovers of a cooperative, which is the
sole producer of a good or service. We show that provided the preferences of the
members of cooperative are not too disperse, it is not a pro￿table strategy to take it
over and convert it into a pro￿t-maximising ￿rm. In the conclusion we discuss how
this result may be extended to other market distortions.
Consider a cooperative of M individuals or members, 1 6 i 6 M: For simplicity
assume that M is odd, so that there is a well-de￿ned median voter. Let m = M
2 +
1
2: Thus a group of individuals has a majority if and only if it contains at least
6m members. The co-operative makes a one dimensional decision, which involves
choosing a variable ￿ from a convex subset of R; ￿: We shall concentrate on the case
where ￿ is the price of output. Members￿preferences are assumed to be single-peaked
in ￿:
In the initial situation, assume that individual i gets bene￿ts ￿0 +di; from shares
in the ￿rm. Here ￿0 denotes the current value of the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts and di denotes the
value of being able to purchase the good below the monopoly price. These bene￿ts
are experienced, whether or not the individual owns shares in the ￿rm. We assume
that the individuals are numbered so that d1 < d2 < ::: < dn: Apart from ruling out
indi⁄erence, this is without loss of generality. Assume that decisions are made by
majority rule, so a change will be introduced if at least half the members approve.
We consider the following model of a takeover attempt. First a raider decides
whether or not to o⁄er to purchase the shares from members at price q: Then the
existing shareholders decide simultaneously and independently whether or not to
accept. If the raider is successful, (s)he will increase pro￿ts to ￿1 by raising price or
eliminating positive externalities.
Suppose a raider o⁄ers to takeover the ￿rm at a price of q per share. Let i denote
a given member of the cooperative. Initially (s)he receives bene￿t ￿0 + di: Assume
(s)he accepts the o⁄er and the takeover fails (s)he can continue to receive the bene￿t
di hence his/her payo⁄is q+di: On the other hand if the takeover succeeds, the raider
will adopt pro￿t-maximising policies and eliminate the bene￿t di; thus i￿ s payo⁄ will
be q: If i rejects the o⁄er and the takeover fails his/her payo⁄ will be unchanged at
￿0 + di: When the takeover succeeds the private bene￿t is eliminated however the
value of the shares will increase thus i￿ s payo⁄ is ￿1: The following table summarises
7the pay-o⁄ of individual i in the various possible outcomes.3
takeover succeeds takeover fails
i accepts q q + di
i rejects ￿1 ￿0 + di
The following result says that a successful takeover is possible if and only if ￿1 ￿
￿o > dm. Hence the amount by which the raider can increase the value of the
￿rm must be greater than the bene￿t which the median shareholder gets from the
controlling the monopoly distortion.
Theorem 2.1 A necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of a subgame
perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, in which the raider succeeds in taking over the
￿rm is: ￿1 ￿ ￿o > dm:
Before we prove this theorem we present a couple of preliminary lemmas. If q > ￿1;
the raider can never make a positive pro￿t, hence we may assume ￿1 > q > ￿0: Let
L = fi;￿0 + di 6 qg be the set of individuals whose total bene￿t from the co-operative
is less than the raider￿ s o⁄er and let jLj denote the number of individuals in this set.
Of course L depends on the price q at which the raider o⁄ers to buy the shares.
Lemma 2.1 If m > jLj; then in any pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame
following the raider￿ s o⁄er precisely m￿1 individuals accept. In particular all mem-
bers of L accept the o⁄er.
Proof. First we shall check that such a pro￿le is indeed an equilibrium. A member
who accepts the o⁄er will get pay-o⁄q+di: This would fall to ￿0+di if (s)he rejected
it. A member who rejects the o⁄er will get pay-o⁄￿0+di: Since every individual who
3Note that whether or not the takeover succeeds depends individual i￿ s decision.
8rejects the o⁄er is pivotal, this would fall to q if (s)he accepts. (Recall by construction,
no member of L rejects the o⁄er and hence ￿0 + di > q:) It follows that this pro￿le
of strategies is indeed an equilibrium.
Now to demonstrate that there are no other pure strategy Nash equilibria. We
shall consider all other possible pro￿les in turn and show that in each case at least
one individual has a pro￿table deviation. First consider pro￿les in which there are
r > m acceptances. In this case the raider will take control of the ￿rm and raise the
share value to ￿1: Consider an individual who accepts the raider￿ s o⁄er. Currently
(s)he receives pay-o⁄ q: If instead (s)he rejected the raider￿ s o⁄er, the bid would still
succeed. Hence his/her payo⁄ would be ￿1 > q:
Secondly consider the case where there are r = m acceptances. Since m > ‘; there
exists an individual ~ { = 2 L who accepts the raider￿ s o⁄er: Such an individual must be
pivotal. If instead (s)he rejected the raider￿ s o⁄er, as before, his/her pay-o⁄ would
be ￿0 + di, which is greater than his/her current pay-o⁄, q:
Thirdly consider a pro￿le, in which there are r = m ￿ 1 acceptances and there
exists ^ { 2 L; who does not accept the o⁄er. Then ^ {￿ s current payo⁄ is ￿0 + di: This
would increase to q if instead ^ { accepted the o⁄er.
Finally consider a pro￿le, in which there are r < m ￿ 1 acceptances. Consider
an individual, k; who currently is rejecting the raider￿ s o⁄er. If (s)he deviated and
accepted (s)he would receive q + dk > ￿0 + dk; which is his/her current pay-o⁄.
Lemma 2.2 If jLj > m; then in any pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame
following the raider￿ s o⁄er precisely m individuals accept. In particular all those who
accept are members of L.
Proof. First we shall check that such a pro￿le is indeed an equilibrium. In such a
pro￿le the raider succeeds in taking over the ￿rm and hence no private bene￿ts will
9be received ex post. Thus an individual who rejects the o⁄er will get pay-o⁄ ￿1: If
instead (s)he accepted the o⁄er his/her pay-o⁄ would fall to q: All individuals who
accept the o⁄er are pivotal and receive pay-o⁄q: If one of them deviated and rejected
the o⁄er (s)he would receive ￿0 + di < q; since all individuals who accept the o⁄er
are in L:
Now to demonstrate that there are no other pure strategy Nash equilibria. We
shall consider all other possible pro￿les in turn and show that in each case at least
one individual has a pro￿table deviation.
First consider pro￿les in which there are r > m + 1 acceptances. In this case the
raider will take control of the ￿rm and raise the share value to ￿1 and eliminate the
private bene￿ts. Consider an individual who accepts the raider￿ s o⁄er. Currently
(s)he receives pay-o⁄ q: If instead (s)he rejected the raider￿ s o⁄er, the bid would still
succeed. Hence his/her payo⁄ would be ￿1 > q:
Secondly consider the case where there are r = m acceptances and there exists
an individual ~ { = 2 L who accepts the raider￿ s o⁄er: Note that such an individual is
pivotal. If instead (s)he rejected the raider￿ s o⁄er as before his/her pay-o⁄ would be
￿0 + di, which is greater than his/her current pay-o⁄, q:
Thirdly consider a pro￿le, in which there are r = m￿1 acceptances. Since ‘ > m
there must exist an individual j 2 L who rejects the o⁄er. If instead (s)he accepted
as before his/her pay-o⁄ would be q, which is greater than his/her current pay-o⁄,
￿0 + dj: Note that j must be pivotal.
Finally consider a pro￿le in which there are r < m ￿ 1 acceptances. Let k be
an individual who rejects the raider￿ s o⁄er. He/she is not pivotal so if instead (s)he
accepted the raider￿ s o⁄er his/her pay-o⁄would increase from ￿0 +dk to q +dk: This
completes the proof.
10Proof of Theorem 2.1 Since individuals will not accept the o⁄er unless it is in
their interest to do so, L = fi : di 6 q ￿ ￿og: For the o⁄er to succeed it is necessary
that q be su¢ ciently high that f1;:::;mg ￿ L:
Suppose that ￿1 ￿ ￿o < dm: To make a pro￿t it is necessary that ￿1 > q: By
Lemma 2.1, if the raider made an o⁄er q such that q ￿ ￿o < dm she would not get
enough acceptances to gain control of the ￿rm. Hence the raider would make a loss
of (m ￿ 1)(￿0 ￿ q): It follows that making such an o⁄er is not part of any subgame
perfect equilibrium.
Now suppose that ￿1 ￿ ￿o > dm: If the raider o⁄ers to buy the shares at price
q = ￿o + dm then L = f1;:::;mg: (We assume that indi⁄erence is resolved in favour
of the raider.) By Lemma 2.2 precisely m individuals will accept the o⁄er hence the
raider will gain control of the ￿rm and make a pro￿t of m(￿1 ￿ q):
Takeovers are e¢ cient (in the sense of maximising total surplus) if n(￿1 ￿ ￿o) >
Pn
i=1 di or ￿1 ￿ ￿o > ￿ d; where ￿ d = 1
n
Pn
i=1 di: If ￿ d > dm (resp. ￿ d < dm) then too
many (resp., too few) takeovers occur in equilibrium. Thus only if ￿ d = dm is the
equilibrium is e¢ cient. Takeovers will occur if and only if they increase total surplus.
Bowen (1943) has shown that if the median voter and the mean voter have the same
preferences then majority voting will result in e¢ cient provision of public goods.
Together the two results imply that an e¢ cient cooperative can only be taken over
when it is socially desirable in the sense that the raider increases the total surplus.
Now assume that the ￿rm can choose the di: If the ￿rm chooses them so that ￿ d = dm
then it will ensure that takeovers occur if and only if they are e¢ cient.
There is a potential distortion within cooperatives. If decisions are made by a
majority vote, the outcome will coincide with the preference of the median voter.
However the cost will be born by the mean voter. If the median and mean voter
11have very di⁄erent preferences then it is possible that the median voter will use the
cooperative to make implicit transfers from the mean voter to himself/herself. If such
distortions occur, the cooperative is unlikely to be e¢ cient. Thus for a cooperative
to be e¢ cient the mean and median member should have similar preferences. In this
case takeovers will be possible if and only if they are e¢ cient.
2.2 Sequential O⁄ers
We believe that the argument is robust and does not depend very crucially on the
details of the interaction between the raider and the cooperative. Suppose that the
raider approached the co-operative members sequentially rather than simultaneously.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that the raider ￿rst approaches individual
1 who accepts or rejects it. Then the raider makes a proposal to individual 2. This
continues until the raider has made his/her o⁄er to all the members. The situation is
one of complete and perfect information. Thus each member knows whether or not
those before him/her have accepted the o⁄er. They also know the preferences of the
members who will be approached later.
For simplicity assume that all members of the cooperative are identical and that
the raider makes the same o⁄er to all of them. The the ￿rst m ￿ 1 members would
accept the o⁄er. Subsequently members of the cooperative will realise that they
are pivotal and will not accept the o⁄er. A similar conclusion would apply even
if the members were not identical, however the analysis would be somewhat more
complicated in this case. In the sequential case, the o⁄er fails because there is always
a pivotal shareholder who internalises the externality.
122.3 Constitutions for Cooperatives
The raider is not able to take-over the ￿rm for the reasons identi￿ed in Grossman
and Hart (1980). The existing shareholders free-ride on the price of shares. By not
accepting the o⁄er, shareholders bene￿t from the increase in price without contribut-
ing to the costs of the takeover. Grossman and Hart (1980) argue that ￿rms have
incentives to overcome the free-rider problem by adopting constitutions, which allow
raiders to either compulsorily purchase minority shares or dilute the rights of mi-
nority shareholders. Alternatively it may be desirable for government to introduce
legislation allowing compulsory purchase of minority shares (as in the UK).
In the present context, the raider￿ s behaviour is undesirable to existing cooperative
members and possibly society in general. It is in the interest of the cooperative to
introduce a constitution, which gives strong protection to minority rights. This will
make free-riding easier and consequently reduce the chances of a hostile takeover.
Hansmann (1996) shows that most consumer cooperatives allocate voting rights in
proportion to the fraction of the output purchased. This would be one way to protect
against takeovers. We can also explain why most governments o⁄er separate laws
dealing with cooperatives and business ￿rms. Protection against takeover may be
more desirable for cooperatives.
Actual cooperatives do not act naively when faced with strategic players. Refsell
(1914) documents how cooperative grain elevators were established in the mid-west
despite a number of attempts by a cartel of grain dealers to prevent them. Both sides
were clearly acting strategically. For instance, the for pro￿t ￿rms tried to organise
boycotts to prevent the wholesalers in Chicago from dealing with cooperatives. In
practice, shares in cooperatives are not freely traded. Members are often required to
sell their shares back to the cooperative if they wish to leave. Decisions are made on
13the basis of ￿ one member one vote￿not one ￿ share one vote￿ . Hence a potential raider
would have to convince a majority of members not the holders of a majority of shares
that (s)he was o⁄ering a good deal. These various legal restrictions make it harder
to takeover a cooperative than is implied by our assumptions. Thus our model is, if
anything, more favourable to the raider than institutions are in practice.
3 CONCLUSION
3.1 Summary
We have shown that cooperatives are not vulnerable to takeover by a raider who
wishes to move the ￿rm toward pro￿t maximisation. In this conclusion we argue
that this analysis is more widely applicable since it can be applied to other markets
distortions in addition to monopoly in the product market. We consider oligopolistic
industries, distortions in input markets and industries with externalities. Moreover
the theory applies to a wider range of ￿rms than just cooperatives. The ￿rm could
equally be a partnership or just a conventional for-pro￿t ￿rm where the shares are
wholly or partly-owned by consumers or other trading partners.
3.2 Oligopolistic Markets
The analysis so far has considered a cooperative, which is the only producer in its
industry. If the cooperative operates in an oligopolistic industry there is a second
e⁄ect which also acts to make takeovers more di¢ cult. Reorganising a cooperative
as a for-pro￿t ￿rm will change the objective function of the ￿rm and this will in turn
change the product market equilibrium. If ￿rms compete Cournot-style the changes
are likely to be unfavourable to the raider.
14These changes may well have perverse e⁄ects on pro￿tability. Suppose that there
is Cournot competition. Then replacing a cooperative by a for-pro￿t ￿rm will cause
that ￿rm to charge a higher price and produce a lower quantity for any given market
conditions. Rival ￿rms will respond by producing more output which will reduce
the pro￿ts of the ￿rm. (Provided reaction curves are downward sloping, as is usual
under Cournot competition.) It is possible that this e⁄ect is su¢ ciently strong for
the cooperative to make a lower pro￿t. In particular if the cooperative￿ s output was
between the Cournot and Stackelberg levels of output, pro￿t will actually be reduced
by converting the cooperative into a for-pro￿t ￿rm. For a more detailed discussion of
the relation between corporate governance and product market equilibrium see Kelsey
and Milne (2005). Related results on strategic delegation in oligopolistic industries
can be found in Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Vickers (1985).
3.3 Other Market Distortions
So far we have focused on the case where there is imperfect competition in output
markets. However the analysis would apply equally well if other markets were dis-
torted. Similar arguments have been advanced to show that industrial democracy can
reduce the impact of asymmetric information (Hansmann (1996)) and externalities
(Roemer (1993) and Kelsey and Milne (2002)). Consider a ￿rm which produces a
negative externality. Then starting at the pro￿t maximising level, shareholders have
an interest to reduce the externality. By similar reasoning a ￿rm will produce more
positive externalities if those controlling the ￿rm are the bene￿ciaries of the exter-
nalities. Although Roemer (1993) emphasises negative externalities such as pollution
or supporting repressive regimes, we believe that positive externalities may be just
as important. The corporate governance literature has attached much importance to
15private bene￿ts of control. These e⁄ects could reasonably be modelled as positive
externalities. Likewise the local public companies discussed in the next section, can
be viewed as ￿rms which provide positive externalities for their shareholders. An-
other example would be corporate social responsibility, which is studied in Besley and
Ghatak (2006). In this case a ￿rm which adopts an ethical policy, for instance not
using child labour, generates positive externalities for shareholders.4
Our theory would, in principle, apply to a ￿rm which provides an externality direct
or pecuniary for its owners. Therefore to many ￿rms which operate in imperfectly
competitive markets for either output or inputs. All that is necessary is to reinterpret
the variable di as the net bene￿t individual i gets from a positive externality produced
by the ￿rm or the value to individual i of controlling a negative externality. In our
model the bene￿ts are received whether or not the individual owns shares in the
￿rm. This assumption is clearly valid for physical externalities such as pollution. It
is likely to hold for most pecuniary externalities between ￿rms. It may or may not
hold for other externalities. Consider for example ethical investment. If the investor
gets a bene￿t directly from reducing child labour then the externality will be present
whether or not the individual retains ownership of the shares. On the other hand if
the externality is a ￿ warm glow￿stemming from his/her own contribution it is unlikely
that this will still be received if the individual￿ s shares are transferred to the raider.
3.4 Local Public Companies
In this section we argue that local public companies have many features in common
with cooperatives and review the empirical evidence. Hansmann (1996) rationalises
4Although Besley and Ghatak (2006) focus on a case where ￿rms provide externalities for their
customers, they note that their analysis could be adapted to apply to situations where shareholders
get positive externalities from the ￿rm, (ethical investment).
16the existence of cooperatives as organisations which economise on monitoring costs.
In addition they occur in situations where local consumers or producers with similar
economic interests could control monopoly power either in input or output markets.
He observes that cooperatives can act as a substitute for regulations that protect
investors, consumers or producers. In some cases the introduction of such regulation
reduces the incentives to form cooperatives.
It is interesting to observe a similarity in the governance of cooperatives and local
public companies with local shareholders, who own shares in related companies. In
both cases the owner/shareholders can attempt to economise on monitoring costs,
and/or other market distortions through joint shareholdings.
Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2005) (henceforth FMR) examine detailed data on the
evolution of ownership patterns of 60 U.K. ￿rms over the twentieth century. They
show that there are signi￿cant factors that play a role at di⁄erent periods of the
evolution of U.K., ￿nancial markets. In the ￿rst half of the twentieth century, legal
investor protection was weak, yet the regional stock-markets thrived. These local
markets traded local ￿rms and their shares were held largely by local shareholders.
FMR argue that informal mechanisms of trust were used to in￿ uence boards of local
directors. They observe that even though there was dispersion of ownership over
time, local concentration of ownership continued to be dominant. FMR argue that
the evidence on takeovers was that the same price was o⁄ered to all shareholders even
in the absence of investor regulatory protection.
Later in the century, this local dominance declined as local stock-markets were
replaced by the London market and institutional shareholders representing geograph-
ically dispersed shareholders became more important. Trust and local informal mech-
anisms were replaced by more formal legal mechanisms to deal with geographically
17dispersed shareholders, dealing through delegated shareholding institutions, that in-
creasingly implemented a market for control. FMR contrast the history of the U.K.
mechanisms with German and Japanese stockmarket history, where banks and/or
share promoters played key roles in monitoring on behalf of shareholders.
In the study by FMR, it would be instructive to see from U.K. data, if local public
companies attracted shareholders who faced pecuniary externalities that arose from
the actions of the ￿rm, either as consumers of their output or suppliers of inputs.
These overlapping interests may have been formalised by mergers and takeovers so
that potential con￿ icts could have been resolved. Over the twentieth century, as
geographic dispersion of the ￿rms￿activities grew by acquisitions and shareholders
became more geographically dispersed, this pecuniary e⁄ect may have diminished.
During this time, mutual or cooperative ￿rms became less common. This could be
explained by the same process of erosion in local trust mechanisms for monitoring, the
increase in regulatory protection, the erosion of local pecuniary e⁄ects by increased
competition, dispersion and mobility of ￿rms and investors.
In the USA, recent empirical research by Allen and Phillips (2000) and Fee, Had-
lock, and Thomas (2006), indicates that there are signi￿cant gains from ownership
links between companies that have customer-supplier relationships, or other product
market relationships. Allen and Phillips (2000) ￿nd that this relationship is particu-
larly strong in high R&D industries.
If this similarity in product and input market imperfections for cooperatives and
corporations is important for governance structures, then our theoretical argument for
the stability of ownership, and internalisation of externalities, would operate for both
cooperatives, locally owned public companies and public companies with customer-
supplier relationships.
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